08/02/08 The following is as I left it in March 2008.  The situation is going pretty much as I predicted.  The lessening of violence has been primarily due to the Iraqi realization that U.S. forces are leaving soon due to the change in our political climate.  It is not due to the surge.  I probably won't update this page any further.

Plan to End the Occupation of Iraq and Have stability in the Region

• Remove our troops from the streets and turn over the fight to Iraqis!

• Develop definite plans to remove our forces entirely from Iraq in 2-3 years.

• Negotiate a Federal (Biden) plan for the government of Iraq.

• Begin a post-Bush settlement of conflicts in the Middle East

Our troops are not and never will be an effective police force in the middle of the civil war in Iraq for any appreciable period of time.   Cultural, religious, political, and national differences prevent identification with the population.   Where U.S. forces are present, Al Qaeda exploits the situation by attacks which provoke counter attacks by our forces in which more Iraqis are killed and the level of hatred and violence is escalated.  This Al Qaeda strategy of violence escalation mimics other terrorist campaigns of the last century.   We have been most successful where we have withdrawn our forces from the streets and allowed Al Qaeda to show themselves as the real enemy of the Iraqi people.  This occurred in Anbar Province where, after making ourselves hated by an all out attack on Falusa, we withdrew from the city.  Al Qaeda overplayed its murderous hand and the locals realigned with the the U.S. forces.

The Iraqi army is not emerging as an effective force and is becoming less of a player for now.  The only viable alternative is to allow nature to take its course where local tribes, war lords, and religious based militias take control.  Those groups must later be drawn into the political process.  (The obvious 'carrot' for drawing them in will be money from oil.)  In the Kurd area in the North the best alternative emerged at the outset with a popularly elected regime in power.  There is effectively a nation of Kurdistan within Iraq where a Kurd army (Iraqi army in name only) provides security.  There has been no conflict and no American casualties. 

While the Kurd area is a special case, the developments in Anbar Province provide a more applicable  model for the rest of Iraq.    We must not fall into the trap of assuming street patrols in Falusa and other cities of Anbar.  That must be done by the local Iraqis.  If US forces take over street patrols, another cycle will begin and will end with Iraqi resistance to US forces. If, as in Sunni Anbar,  Al Qaeda falls into disfavor when left alone with Sunnis, that will happen more quickly in Shiite areas.  Again, the first element of a successful strategy is to get our troops out of the Sunni, Shiite, Al Qaeda quagmire on the Iraqi streets.

 The patience of Americans with the costs of the war in lives and money has grown thin.  We have lost well over 4000 American lives, committed 10s of thousands to lifelong disabilities, and caused the suicides of many thousands more.  We continue to pay $720 million each day.  That daily cost could build 84 elementary schools, or pay the yearly salaries of 18,000 teachers,  or resurface thousands of miles of highways, repair our bridges, etc. 

Democratic leaders in Congress have made it clear that withdraw of U.S. forces will happen soon.  The Iraqis have realized that they must fight the enemy which plans to stay (Al Qaeda) and not the enemy which plans to leave (the United States).  Ground commanders seem to have recognized these dynamics and are turning the fight over to newly willing Iraqi groups. Update 4/2/08: Just when things were getting better, Iraqi Prime Minister al-Maliki launches an attack on Shiites in Basra.  That precipitated unrest in Baghdad with mortar fire on the Green Zone.   This followed a visit by Cheney by one week.  Arrogance seems to trump common sense on a regular basis with the Bush Administration.

The best plan for long term stability is that proposed by Senator Biden which he says is compatible with the current Iraqi constitution.  Under his plan, Iraq would have a central government over a number of fairly autonomous regions (like our states).  At the outset, regional  leaders would be assured of a substantial role in the governing of their individual areas.  It will be necessary for Iraq to accept  warlords and religious leaders in the short term with popularly elected officials being the long term goal achievable only when the Iraqi army is a viable/accepted force. The central government would be charged with providing an equitable distribution of oil revenues, the coordination of common efforts, and command of the Iraqi army.   In the short term, the Iraqi army would provide local security where that is viable but its primary role would be to provide for defense of the nation.  US troops (30,000 to 50,000 soldiers with substantial air support available) would need to be present (in green zone type areas) for a period of time (2 to 3 years) as the Iraqi army is rebuilt to assume the defense role.  The U.S. air forces will need to be positioned to support the defense of Iraq from its neighbors for a longer period. 

The current Congress must continue to make it clear that American forces will withdraw soon.   Congress must continue to pressure the  Bush administration to adopt a posture which allows constructive thought and intelligent solutions. 

The Bush Administration attempted a regional negotiation centering on the Israeli-Palestinian question at Annapolis in late November 2007.  Its prospects of success were illustrated by the statement of a Saudi representative, "There is a feeling that all of us are exhausted by this.  To have stability in the Middle East, the Palestinian issue must be resolved."   Progress from that conference has not been apparent.

As a new President comes into office in 2009, a new effort to stabilize the Middle East must be initiated.  That effort must be based on finding equitable agreements among nations.  Such agreements must seek equity among people.  These agreements must circumvent the petty desires for power by the region's religious leaders and the international commercial interests.  In other words, agreements must based on fundamental integrity.